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Introduction
Social interactions play a big role in economic interactions. They influence the decisions of economic agents like consumers and firms, making them relevant to understand economic problems. Ranging from peer effects in schools to financial networks, the applications are wide. The dynamic of these networks shape the outcomes of variables such as education attainment, crime behavior and labor markets. (TOPA, 2011; JACKSON, 2011; ZENOU, 2009) Empirical and anecdotal evidence points out that some part of the current job search is done through informal social networks, such as friends, family and neighbors. This could potentially reduce search frictions and augment efficiency of job allocation. On the other hand, congestion and quality of networks might worsen labor market outcomes. Nevertheless, empirical evidence, specially for Brazil, is scarce.
It is also noticeable that immigrants and ethnic populations tend to form tight networks, due to several reasons (GROSS; SCHMITT, 2003) . This fact usually implies that these groups rely more on referral methods than traditional ones, although not necessarily being more efficient (BATTU; SEAMAN; ZENOU, 2011; ZENOU, 2012) . With the recent immigration policy discussions in major economies, whether these populations have different job search dynamics and labor market outcomes than native populations is important to better direct policies towards them. Moreover, Sao Paulo city has had a long history of immigration, with really diverse groups coming since 1880, first with Italians, going through the Japanese and Lebanese immigration and more recently with Latin and Central American populations, among others throughout the recent history.
This dissertation aims to analyze the role of referral hiring in the São Paulo labor market for immigrant populations. More specifically, we are interested in whether referral hiring improves or not wages and turnover of immigrant workers in São Paulo. A straightforward attempt to understand this question would imply a OLS regression of wages/turnover on a variable indicating that this job was obtained through a referral. However, several identification issues arises, as the job search method is not used randomly across individuals and it is therefore correlated with observed and unobserved characteristics of the firm, the worker and the labor market itself.
We examine empirically this issue on the Sao Paulo labor market. First, we check if referral is a relevant job search method using data that has specific information about it. We find that referral is the second most used method of job search for workers (not just foreigners) in São Paulo, and that its use is more important for certain groups, such as informal and low educated workers.
Then, by relying on a matched worker-firm panel data to address identification problems, we use the share of same nationality workers in the firm one year before a foreign worker was hired as a proxy for a referral hiring. This proxy is based on an empirical strategy developed by Dustmann et al. (2016) . Given fixed worker and firm fixed effects, if this share impacts wages and turnovers solely through referral, then we can interpret this proxy as probability of being hired through a referral. We see that this variable is a very good predictor of a firm's hiring behaviour by using a firm-nationality-year data and regressing the share of new hires of a specific nationality against our proxy.
We see that foreign workers that were hired with many same nationality workers in the firm one year before earn lower wages than if there were fewer same nationality workers. This is consistent with some placebo exercises. Moreover, this impact seems to be heterogenous on educations levels. Nationalities with low education levels absorb all the negative impact, while high education nationalities show no impact whatsoever. Also, the hiring probabilities of nationalities with low educated worker are greater.
We interpret these results as referral being mostly important for low skilled immigrants. The PME gives us indirect evidence that they use more referrals as job search method. Our regressions shows us that they have a higher probability of obtaining jobs due to referral, but these jobs being low quality ones. This interpretation is compatible with the literature of a bad network "trap" (CALVó-ARMENGOL; JACKSON, 2007; BATTU; SEAMAN; ZENOU, 2011) .
One of the first works that attempted to model the relationship between social networks and labor market outcomes was Montgomery (1991) . Building a two-period adverse selection model of the labor market with a simple social structure, the author assumes that firms will only ask for a referral to their high ability workers, thus producing a premium on wages of the referral market.
More recently, more complex works started to emerge. Perhaps the first study to model an explicit network in a dynamic framework was Calvó-Armengol e Jackson (2004) . According to them, agents receive information from job openings at a certain probability. Those who are already employed will randomly pass this information to a person from his network that is unemployed. Because their model is dynamic, it allows them to conclude that, even though on the first moment being in a network with a lot of unemployed agents may be harmful because of competition, on the long run the extent of the network has a multiplier effect, because friends of friends of friends and etc will affect their own status.
In a generalization of their first model, Calvó-Armengol e Jackson (2007) includes wage dynamics, and show that making ones neighbors better off or adding new agents to the network will improve the agent's future wages. Also, adding to the literature of racial wage inequality, the authors show that if two different social groups with the same information network start out with different wage and employment levels, there will be persistent differences of drop-out rates and wages in the long run. This highlights the fact that, although the two groups have the same job information network, the state of the agent's network have important long-run effects.
Tying to the job search-and-match literature, works like Fontaine (2008) and Dustmann et al. (2016) have incorporated the role of social networks into models with on-the-job search and wage bargaining. For instance, the first author shows that wage dispersion arises in a context of unequal arrival rates, which are caused by different unemployment rates across networks. On the other hand, the latter models networks in a way that lowers the noise of the worker's real productivity, so referral hires are on average better than others, with higher wages and lower turnovers.
The empirical body of work has approached the referral effect in two ways. The way most of them have proceeded is to approximate social space to geographical space. It can be reasonable to consider that attributes not only define social space such as ethnicity, race, age, etc, but also interact with physical distance, since the cost to maintain an interaction increases with it. Although arguably the people in your friends and relatives' network do not necessarily live in your neighborhood, it is a simplified hypothesis due to modeling and data constraints. Specifically in labor market themes, detailed data of networks is hard to come by (TOPA; ZENOU, 2015).
As noted by Manski (1993) , identification of social network effects on labor market outcomes suffer from what is called the reflection problem, i.e., that it is difficult to distinguish individual decisions that are potentially affected by aspects from the network from the characteristics of the network, which in turn impact the individual's decision. Careful econometric strategy has to be employed to address this.
Earlier works on this theme used to focus on natural experiments evidence. Both the Moving to Opportunity program, which randomly assigned housing vouchers for volunteers, or the resettlement of refugees in various cities have served as experiments (TOPA; ZENOU, 2015).
Bayer, Ross e Topa (2008) developed a novel identification strategy that do not depend on natural experiments, and it was used in later studies by other authors. Noticing the difficulties of properly identifying neighborhood effects because of the sorting and unobserved heterogeneity of individuals and neighborhoods, the authors use Census data from the Boston metropolitan area which details the city block where individuals live and work to compare outcomes for neighbors who reside in the same block against those who live in the same neighborhood, but not on the same block. The findings are that the probability of working together if residing on the same block is 33% greater than if residing on nearby blocks. The underlying identification hypothesis is that, given the neighborhood, there is no correlation in unobserved traits at the block level.
Another way to measure the importance of referrals is to comprehend what impacts it has on the duration of job spells and wage levels of jobs obtained through referrals. Dustmann et al. (2016) , for example, shows that indeed job search networks improve labor market outcomes by reducing informational frictions and improving productivity. They use an employer-employee matched panel data to test whether worker's wages and layoff rates are better if they obtained their job through a referral, and their evidence points to that direction.
In order to investigate social networks and their effect on wage premiums, Schmutte (2015) builds a sample of job-to-job movers from 2002 to 2003 and a variable of each workers' job quality information network that consists of the average wage premium of all the employed workers that live in his own block. Their main finding is that neighbors have a high probability of working together and of becoming employed in high paying jobs when their neighbors already work in high wage firms.
Focusing on ethnic minorities, Patacchini e Zenou (2012) explores the relationship between finding a job through social networks and the residential proximity of ethnic minorities. Following one of the implications of Calvó-Armengol e Jackson (2004) that the length of weak ties lowers the probability of finding jobs, their result is that this probability for minorities decreases rapidly with physical distance. Also, living with large numbers of employed neighbors of the same ethnicity raises the likelihood of having jobs.
On the other hand, Battu, Seaman e Zenou (2011) argues that ethnic networks do not necessarily help recent immigrants, for example, and that the longer these individuals reside in the UK, the more they resort to direct methods of finding jobs.
Contributing to the literature on the "adverse" effects of networks, Battisti, Peri e Romiti (2016) develops a model with two job search methods, a formal one and a network-referral based one. Their findings show that the size of the ethnic network upon arrival of the individual in the country are positively correlated with employment but negatively correlated with human capital. Also, in the long run, wages and match quality are worse for them, compared to immigrants that had a smaller network size. This is related to the conclusion of Calvó-Armengol e Jackson (2007) that networks where the individuals have low quality of employment have persistent long run effects.
Data
Some theoretic and empirical works have found that jobs obtained through referral have better outcomes in terms of wages, turnover, duration, etc. But firstly, it is important to establish if referral hiring is a relevant characteristic of the brazilian and the Sao Paulo labor market.
The PME (Monthly Employment Survey, in Portuguese) allows us to try to find some evidence of this matter in the São Paulo labor market. It is a longitudinal rotational survey that interviews households for seven Metropolitan Areas that can produce statistics about fluctuations and tendencies of the urban labor market. One of the questions of the survey asks what was the last method one took to find a job for all workers who never worked or that left his previous job at least one year before. As can be seen on Table 1 , although only 8.30% answered that they referred to relatives or friends, it is still the second most relevant method. Also, restricting to those that were asked and got a job in the subsequent interview, we see that referral still maintains its relative importance in Table 2 . Conditioning this question to education and wage levels 1 , we see on Tables 3 and 4 that referral raises in importance for the low education and low wage individuals. Also, in Table 5 we see that referral is more important in obtaining informal jobs. This seems to indicate that referral is more relevant to certain groups than others.
Since the PME has a direct variable of referral, a straightforward exercise would be to analyze its impact on labor market outcomes. Nevertheless, we can't control for several omitted variables, such as worker and firm fixed effects. 2 Because of this limitation, we consider that the RAIS, a matched worker-employer panel survey available from 2003 to 2013, is more adequate. It is a nation-wide survey that has to be answered by all formal firms every year, with information about firm and worker characteristics. Besides key variables such as occupation, wages, education levels and work history, we also have worker nationality, which we use to define immigrants. Therefore, naturalized and ethnic but brazilian born workers are not considered to be immigrants. We restrict ourselves to the city of Sao Paulo, because it has had a very long history with immigration and has a very dynamic labor market.
Empirical Strategy
With this framework, it is possible to apply the methodology developed by Dustmann et al. (2016) to São Paulo. Following their notation, we would like to estimate:
Where y ijt can be the log wage of worker i or an indicator equal to 1 if the worker leaves the firm in t + 1, Ref τ ij is equal to 1 if the worker obtained the job through referral on firm j in year τ , X ijt is a vector of time varying characteristics and γ t , δ i and f j are year, worker and firm fixed effects, while ijt is the error term. If referral has a positive impact on wages and turnover, we should expect that β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0 and β 1 < 0 and β 2 > 0 for the wage and turnover regression respectively (because firms and workers learn over time).
Both the database used by the authors and the RAIS do not offer information about referral hiring, so they use a proxy variable motivated by their theoretical model: the share of workers from the same minority group in the firm one period before the worker was hired, S τ −1 gj , where g is the minority group of the individual. If immigrant workers refer people of their own ethnicity to their employer, then the higher the share of foreign workers in a firm, the more likely it is that the firm will hire workers from group g through a referral.
Another important assumption for the proxy variable to work is that conditional on worker and firm fixed effects, this share of workers from the same minority group in the firm one period before the worker's hiring must impact wages and turnovers only through referrals. We can argue that this is an acceptable assumption for several reasons. First, worker fixed effects control for the fact that certain nationalities or type of workers may tend to use more referral as a means of job search (as shown in the PME survey). Second, the inclusion of firm fixed effects take into account the possibility that certain types of firms might use more referral, or hire more from a specific nationality. Lastly, both inclusions control for non-random sorting of workers and firms, that is, low-skilled workers sort into firms that employ workers from the same nationalities.
Due to the size of the database and the number of fixed effects, when estimating equation 3.1 we used only the years of 2009 to 2013 and employed an algorithm developed by Correia (2014) to calculate high dimension fixed effects and clustered standard errors. To motivate this, if the own group share is positively related to the probability of obtaining a job through a referral, then firms that employed a higher share of minority workers in the past will be more likely to hire from that group in the future. To test this, the following regression will be estimated:
where H τ gj is the share of minority workers from group g among all new hires in firm j at time τ , S τ −1 gj is the share of minority workers from the same group in the firm in
are demand and supply side controls, γ τ g is minority group-specific year fixed effects and u τ gj is the error term. If α 1 is positive and significant, then there is evidence that the proposed proxy variable is valid, that is, that the share of same nationality workers in t − 1 is a good predictor for the firm's hiring behaviour. Also, it can also be a good indicator that foreigner workers are benefited in terms of a greater probability of finding a job due to the presence of same nationality workers. We do not use firm fixed effects in this case because then we would be eliminating most of the variation, and the fact that firms with many foreigners tend (or not) to hire more foreigners of the same nationality would be entirely captured by the fixed effects.
Results
Main Results
Results from equation 3.2 can be found in Table 6 . To estimate this model, we built a firm-nationality-year database from 2003 to 2013, using the 17 largest minorities. Results indicate that the share of foreigners in t − 1 helps predict the firm's hiring behaviour. If the share from a nationality in a firm before hiring increases by 10 percentage points, the share of foreigners from that group among the new hires will increase by 4.2 percentage points. Also, this parameter can be interpreted as the probability of obtaining a job through referral 1 , meaning that 42% of foreigners obtain jobs through referral. Standard errors are clustered in firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Nationality-year specific fixed effects included. Dependent variable is the share of foreigners of a nationality over all new hires in t. Only firms that hired someone in a year were used. The largest 17 minority groups were used, which make up almost 95% of all foreigners. Model 2 includes share of women, low education and mid education new hires as controls, which are all interacted with nationality dummies. Model 3 includes the share of workers from other nationalities as a proxy for the firm's openness to foreigners. All observations are weighted by the number of new hires in a firm on a given year because data are group-mean. When not weighted, estimates drop to around 0.25 at 1% significance.
This result indicates then that foreign workers are benefited by a large presence of same nationality workers in a firm through a higher probability of being hired.
Looking at the impact of the share of same nationality workers one year before the hiring on wages on Table 7 , it seems that increasing the share of workers from the same nationality one year before hiring by 10 p.p. would decrease their wages by 1,9%.
This result is consistent throughout most specifications, including the most robust one, with worker and firm fixed effects. For turnover decisions, results are inconsistent, 1 This is implied by the model developed by Dustmann et al. (2016) 2 The raw number from the PME is lower, around 12%, but for the whole population and not only foreigners.
3 These results are similar to the ones found by Dustmann et al. (2016) with the final specification not showing results, although the point estimate might indicate a lower probability of leaving the firm when there are same-nationality workers on the firm. The second equation interacts our variable of interest with tenure, to check if the results found above increase or decrease over time. For wages, the results seem to reinforce the fact that these workers have lower wages, even after some time in the firm. For turnover, the previously expected results appears, indicating that these workers have a lower probability of leaving, but that it decreases over time, possibly because of learning within the firm. While Dustmann et al. (2016) methodology confirms that minority workers in Munich have higher wages and lower turnover rates when hired through referral, when applied to Sao Paulo, the results on wages are the opposite, seemingly supporting models that predict negative effects of networks on foreigners. effect on wages and turnovers. Using the PME survey, we have shown that low education workers or those that obtained informal jobs or jobs that pay lower wages tend to use more referral methods. If this holds up for foreigner workers too, and we consider that informal workers also tend to receive lower wages, then our regression is underestimating the effect due to the absence of this fraction of foreign workers in our dataset. Hence, the negative effects on wages and turnovers could be potentially greater if taken into account informal workers.
This contradicting result regarding wages and turnover might be related to the heterogeneity of the different ethnic groups in Sao Paulo, that is, their networks could have different qualities. Whereas groups from OECD countries tend to have high education levels and relatives with high quality jobs in Sao Paulo, immigrants from poorer countries form networks with low employment levels, for example. This heterogeneity, considering that education levels didn't change over the years for these workers, is controlled by fixed effects, so they do not explicitly show up on the results. Table 15 in the Appendix separates nationalities by their median education level.
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It is noticeable that the low and high education groups are each composed by nationalities of the same region, and that some anecdotal patterns emerge, such as the East Asian minorities belonging to the high education one. In Table 8 , descriptive statistics are shown for the low and high education. To understand whether these characteristics are important to characterize referral effects, two models were estimated, one with only Low Education nationalities and another with only High Education ones. Results are in Table 9 . On the baseline model, wages are negatively affected by the share of same nationality workers only in the low education group, while all other coefficients are not statistically signficant. When adding the interaction with tenure, there is no significant effect in column (2), but expected positive impacts of referral show up in column (1) for turnover. To further understand the heterogeneity of the referral effect on immigrants, now we estimate hiring regressions with country specific dummies. In this way, we can assess if certain nationalities suffer stronger impacts. We consider that equation 3.2, which was devised as a test for the validity for the proxy variable, also captures the hiring behaviour and therefore the impact on hiring. For this regression, we interacted our main variable with a dummy for all 17 nationalities used.
6 The same was not done with the wage and turnover regressions due to the very low variablity in the data for many nationalities when including firm and worker fixed effects. Table 10 shows that, in general, nationalities in the low education group tend to have a higher probability of being hired, besides the previous result that they also have the greater negative impact on wages.
The results for this robustness exercise could be interpreted as referral being important only to low skilled immigrants. This is consistent with the patterns found in Standard errors are clustered in firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients from estimates of equation 3.2 where the proxy variable was interacted with nationality dummies. Nationality-year specific fixed effects included. Only firms that hired someone in a year were used. The largest 17 minority groups were used, which make up almost 95% of all foreigners. All observations are weighted by the number of new hires in a firm on a given year because data are group-mean.
the PME survey, where individuals with low income and low education depended more on referrals. Since low educated foreigners need to rely more on referrals between their counterparts, which are itself low skilled and in worse jobs, it creates a sort of "trap" in a bad network, a hypothesis found in Calvó-Armengol e Jackson (2007) and Battu, Seaman e Zenou (2011) . Nevertheless, these workers are still getting jobs, perhaps more so than if they did not rely on their networks, which is what we observe above. Also, considering the theoretical model by Dustmann et al. (2016) , where referral reduces the noise firms face when observing a worker's true productivity, it seems that for high skilled immigrants this noise is less important, maybe because they have other ways to decrease it, like past experience.
Additional Results
To make sure we are identifying the effect we are seeking, we devised a couple of placebo tests. First, to understand whether we are capturing a spurious coefficient or not, we keep only foreign workers that were hired when there were no other same nationality workers in t − 1 and build a new variable that is the share of all other foreigners in the firm in t − 1 If the impact that we captured in our main results is true, we should expect that there would be no effect, since the channel through which workers gain/lose wages or turnover rates is solely the presence of same nationality coworkers in t − 1. On the other hand, if we just keep firms that hired workers of a certain nationality in which in t − 1 there were only workers of that same nationality (excluding brazilians), then our main impact would be intensified. Results are in Table 11 . Correia (2014) was used, which drops singleton observations which are not used when calculating fixed effects. Column 1 shows the baseline results. Column 2 keeps only workers that were hired in which the firm in t-1 had no other own nationality workers, but had other nationality workers present. On the other hand, column 3 keeps only workers that were hired in which the firm in t-1 had only workers from the same nationality, excluding cases in which there were other nationalities present. All variables are interacted with a dummy for foreign status. Brazilian workers are pooled together so that their fixed effects are also estimated. Number of observations vary from 28,419,862 to 25,907,714 in the wage regression and from 28,874,618 to 26,360,178 Results from the placebo tests for the wage regression follow our expectations, in which we find no effect for the first placebo and a greater effect in the same direction for the second placebo. In the turnover regression, in both cases we get a negative and statistically significant impact. This seems to indicate that the mere presence of foreigners in your firm one year before being hired is enough to lower your turnover probability. Conversely, it might be just a spurious correlation.
Another important characterization of immigrant groups are their size. Newly arrived immigrants could benefit from a large sized network due to the greater information available or they could be constrained by it because they are limited to the referral channels and do not employ active search through other methods. Likewise, years since immigration can be relevant to determine wages and turnovers of foreigners as noted by Battu, Seaman e Zenou (2011) and Battisti, Peri e Romiti (2016) . On the one hand, nationalities that have arrived some time ago, and thus have been more or less assimilated to the local labor market, should use more formal methods of job search, and the impact of having friends in a firm of your own nationality would matter less. On the other hand, if these groups are larger, there could be some substantial congestion effect, generating a more negative impact on both wages and turnovers.
Since the RAIS does not offer any information on immigration years, it is not possible to do this analysis. However, the Census Survey for 2010 does offer this information on a micro level. It asks every foreigner surveyed which year they arrived in Brazil. With this information, it is possible to assign a median value of years of immigration for every nationality in Sao Paulo, and then relate it to our dataset. Network size can be calculated using the frequency of the RAIS data or the Census data. We expect that network size and immigration years are negatively correlated, because older immigration groups are already in their second, third or more generation. Both measures have a high correlation coefficient, as can be seen in Table 12 , and immigration years and nation frequency from RAIS have the expected signal. Table 13 shows the first and last five nationalities in our dataset in terms of their median immigration years from the Census Survey.
7
We create categories of "degree of assimilation" and of network size and interact them both with our main variable of interest.
8 9 With this new regression, we expect that 7 It is important to note that the Haitian mass immigration to Brazil started in 2010, so the Census Survey does not capture that information, having only one ocurrence of a Haitian immigrant that arrived in 19XX, while the RAIS dataset already incorporates this phenomenom. This information was manually changed to reflect it. 8 Because it is a time-invariant variable, we can only do a simple interaction, that is, if x is our variable of interest and y is our category variable, interactions such as x + y + x × y are not possible, only x × y. Thus, we are essentialy doing four different regression, one for each category. 9 Table 16 and 17 in the Appendix shows what nations are in each group. groups of longer immigration history and greater network size presents either similar or more negative coefficients.
In Table 14 , we see that estimates for the wage model are negative overall for all quartiles of network sizes and immigration ages. For turnover, we have no significante in general, similar to the baseline results. This probably indicates that this categorization was more of a random grouping than one with some economic significance. Nevertheless, these two measures proposed suffer from identification and measurement errors, which could be explaining their seemingly absence of economic relevance. 
Conclusion
Referral hiring is a very important component of the job search in the Sao Paulo labor market. It is also a city that has always had a rich immigrantion history. In this dissertation, we examine the relation between referral hiring and immigrant labor market outcomes in Sao Paulo. To do so, we use a matched employer-employee panel dataset of all formal workers and consider the impact of a proxy of referral hiring on wages and turnover.
The proxy we use to identify a referral hiring for a specific nationality is the share of that nationality in the total of workers in a firm one year before the hiring. We test the validity of this proxy by regressing the share of that nationality in all new hires against it, and we see that it is indeed a good predictor for the firm hiring behaviour, with an increase in 10 p.p. of the proxy increasing the share of foreigners of that group among new hires by 4.2 percentage points. Also, this predictor is stronger for certain nationalities, in particular ones with workers with low education.
Moreover, the impact of that proxy, and thus referral hiring, on wages is negative while for turnover it has no statiscal significance. That is, if the share of workers of a nationality increased by 10 p.p. one year before the hiring, then wages would decrease by 1.9%. Identification issues are dealed by including relevant sets of controls and firm and fixed effects, given that conditional on them, the proxy only impacts wages and turnovers through referral.
These results are consistent with some of the literature of the adverse effects of referral. Although these low skilled workers are getting more jobs, they are not high quality ones, due to the fact that these workers rely more on referral and thus are trapped in bad networks.
This effect on wages is heterogenous on education, where nationalities with low education workers keep the negative impact, while high education ones show no impact at all. This is consistent with data from the PME that these groups, on a general level and not restricted to foreigners, tend to use more referral hiring. Placebo tests reinforce the validity of these results.
Finally, we devise an exercise to check the heterogeneity of these impacts on network sizes, immigration age of nationalities and region or country of origin. They are mostly inconclusive, but also suffer from a great deal of measurement errors and selection bias. Further steps would include a formal model to motivate the findings. Since the PME has a direct variable of referral, we proposed two questions to be answered: do people that tried to find a job through referral had greater probability to succeed in the subsequent interview, and do people that got a job through referral stayed employed in the next two interviews more than those that found from another measure?
The data set that will be used is the PME (Monthly Employment Survey, in Portuguese). We will restrict our data to the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area, or SPMA, in the years of 2007 to 2012. Because there is a lot of friction and loss between interviews, Ribas e Soares (2008) developed an algorithm to identify and reduce them, which we use to recover the longitudinal data.
1
In terms of regression analysis, the baseline equation is the following:
Where y i is whether individual i was employed or not, d is a vector of dummies which represent the measure the individual took to obtain the job and X is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics. The main variable of interest in this simple analysis is whether the individual took any measures to obtain a job in the last month, and which one was that.
To check for evidences of the two aforementioned questions, the data set has to be arranged in different ways. For the first one, whether people that contact friends and family have greater probability to find a job, we begin by keeping only those that were present and economically active throughout the first four interviews and were unemployed in the first interview while also looking for jobs in any of the above measures. In this way, if the agent answered in t − 1 it referred to relatives or friends, and in t got a job, we identify this as a referral hiring. Then, we maintain only the second interview, and regress the state of the individual (employed or not) against three dummy variables that are 1 according to the measure it took in t − 1 and some socioeconomic variables.
For the second question, the initial sampling is the same, but in this case, we restrict ourselves to those that were unemployed in the first interview, took a measure to find a job and got it in the second interview, or were employed in the first interview, took a measure to find a job and got it in the second interview by changing jobs. Then, we check whether this individual stayed in this job for the next two interviews, and regress it against the dummies and socioeconomic variables.
Note that these models suffer from several identification problems, including low number of observations, and do not try to imply any kind of causality between the variables, but merely correlations and indications of the validity of the hypothesis. After subsetting for the two cases, the data set goes from 581,836 observations and 145,459 unique individuals to 854 and 100 observations respectively (also the number of unique individuals).
We would also like to see if there is a difference on the relevance of referral hiring between ethnicity and race, so we also regress using only White and Black individuals. Below are the results. Columns (1), (2) and (3) models 1 with full sample, only with whites and only with blacks respectively, while (4) is for model 2 with full sample. Since the number of observations dropped significantly for model 2, the separate regressions were not estimated. We see that, according to the results, the probability of getting a job is on average 12% higher than the other methods, which have no statistical significance. When we divide between whites and blacks, agencies seem to become the relevant method for the first group. When we look to the second model, we see that both referral and agencies seem to rise the probability of maintaining that job for the next two months.
Again, these indications are mere correlation. But, the above results might indicate referral hiring is relevant in the São Paulo labor market, and that there may be differences between races.
